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Abstract 30	
The visual probe (VP) paradigm provides evidence that emotional stimuli attract attention. 31	
Such effects have been reported even when stimuli are presented outside of awareness. These 32	
findings have shaped the idea that humans possess a processing pathway that detects 33	
evolutionarily significant signals independently of awareness. Here, we addressed two 34	
unresolved questions: First, if emotional stimuli attract attention, is this driven by their 35	
affective content, or by low-level image properties (e.g. luminance contrast)?  Second, does 36	
attentional capture occur under conditions of genuine unawareness? We found that observers 37	
preferentially allocated attention to emotional faces under aware viewing conditions. 38	
However, this effect was best explained by low-level stimulus properties, rather than 39	
emotional content. When stimuli were presented outside of awareness (via continuous flash 40	
suppression or masking), we found no evidence that attention was directed towards emotional 41	
face stimuli.  Finally, observer’s awareness of the stimuli (assessed by d prime) predicted 42	
attentional cuing. Our data challenge existing literature: First, we cast doubt on the notion of 43	
preferential attention to emotional stimuli in the absence of awareness. Second, we question 44	
whether effects revealed by the VP paradigm genuinely reflect emotion-sensitive processes, 45	
instead suggesting they can be more parsimoniously explained by low-level variability 46	
between stimuli.  47	
 48	
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Public Significance Statement 50	
Emotionally salient stimuli (such as fearful faces) are prioritised in attention, even when they 51	
are presented outside of awareness. Moreover, such effects are often found to be larger in 52	
anxious populations, suggesting that emotion sensitive mechanisms that operate without 53	
awareness may be involved in the aetiology/ maintenance of anxiety disorders. However, the 54	
mechanisms underlying such ‘emotional attention’ effects remain unclear. Here we show that 55	
i) emotional stimuli only attract attention under conditions where observers are aware of 56	
stimuli. ii) preferential attention to emotional faces is best explained by low-level stimulus 57	
properties (e.g. luminance contrast) rather than emotion-sensitive processes. Our study 58	
highlights the need for careful experimental control in basic and clinical research 59	
investigating the link between emotion and attention. 	  60	
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Human visual perception has limited capacity and must direct resources towards 62	
salient stimuli, events and spatial locations. Many behavioural studies suggest that 63	
emotionally salient (particularly threatening) stimuli attract our attention (Armony & Dolan, 64	
2002; Ohman, Flykt & Esteves, 2001; Vuilleumier & Schwartz, 2001). The visual probe 65	
paradigm provides evidence of this effect. On a typical trial, an emotionally salient and a 66	
neutral target stimulus are presented on either side of a central fixation cross, before a probe 67	
(usually a small dot or arrow) appears at the location preceded by either the emotional 68	
stimulus (valid trial) or neutral stimulus (invalid trial). Observers then make a speeded 69	
response to indicate the location or orientation of the probe (left vs. right, or pointing up or 70	
down). Responses are typically faster in valid trials than invalid trials, suggesting that spatial 71	
attention has been preferentially allocated to the location of the emotional stimulus (Bar-72	
Haim, Lavy, Pergamin, Bakermans-Kranenburg, & van Ijzendoorn, 2007). There is 73	
tremendous interest in understanding the mechanisms of this selection process - how does the 74	
visual system prioritize stimuli that are most important to its survival? 75	
Evolutionary theories suggest that humans possess an independent, sub-cortical visual 76	
pathway that operates without awareness and rapidly directs processing resources towards 77	
threatening stimuli (Garrido, 2012; Tamietto & de Gelder, 2010). This theory has intuitive 78	
appeal - it may take hundreds of milliseconds for retinal stimulation to generate a conscious 79	
percept (Koch, 2004; Sekar, Findley, Poeppel, & Llinás, 2013). If threats could modulate an 80	
observer's behaviour rapidly and independently of their conscious registration, survival odds 81	
would be increased (Morris, Öhman, & Dolan, 1999). This notion is intriguing, because it 82	
suggests that there are specialised ways of (and independent neural substrates for) prioritising 83	
affective stimuli. Moreover, such an idea has influenced thinking about clinical disorders. For 84	
instance, dysfunction in the systems involved with preconscious threat detection are thought 85	
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to underlie the hypersensitivity to threat and maladaptive perceptual biases exhibited by 86	
individuals with anxiety disorders (Mogg & Bradley, 1998; Ohman & Mineka, 2001).  87	
 Evidence for the unconscious prioritisation of threat has typically relied on measuring 88	
responses to stimuli that are presented to observers outside of awareness (Kim & Blake, 89	
2005). A long history of observations from paradigms such as backward masking, binocular 90	
rivalry and continuous flash suppression (CFS) has revealed that threat stimuli suppressed 91	
from awareness can nonetheless elicit adaptive changes in neural activity (Jiang & He, 2006; 92	
Whalen et al., 2004; Williams, Morris, McGlone, Abbott, & Mattingley, 2004) and 93	
physiological arousal (Lapate, Rokers, Li, & Davidson, 2013; Ohman & Soares, 1994). 94	
Behaviourally, the masked visual probe (MVP) paradigm has provided evidence that 95	
threat stimuli receive prioritized processing in the absence of awareness. In a modification of 96	
the standard visual probe design, target stimuli are presented briefly, and then replaced with a 97	
masking pattern. The small stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) between the target and mask 98	
(usually ~17 or ~33 milliseconds) means that observers typically report perceiving the mask, 99	
but not the preceding target stimulus (Wiens & Ohman, 2007): visual presentation of the 100	
target stimulus is dissociated from awareness of it. Thus, the MVP paradigm can be 101	
employed as a tool to examine attentional orienting to emotionally salient stimuli in the 102	
absence of their conscious registration.  103	
 In a recent meta-analysis of the MVP paradigm (Hedger, Gray, Garner, & Adams, 104	
2016) we found that the magnitude of threat-related bias (i.e. the valid vs. invalid response 105	
time (RT) difference) across all stimulus types (including fear and angry faces, negative 106	
words and images from the International Affective Picture System) tends to be small 107	
(Cohen’s dz = 0.28). Our analyses also suggest that effect sizes are strongly modulated by 108	
stimulus visibility: the threat-related bias was significantly larger if the SOA between stimuli 109	
and masks was >30 ms than if it was < 30ms. Critically, this suggests that unintended 110	
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stimulus visibility may increase threat-related biases: many observers achieve above-chance 111	
detection of 33ms targets, as revealed by stringent signal detection measures of awareness 112	
(Pessoa, Japee, Sturman, & Ungerleider, 2006; Szczepanowski & Pessoa, 2007). In addition, 113	
we found that this effect of SOA on threat bias was greater within studies that did not 114	
implement an awareness check to verify that masking successfully eliminated stimulus 115	
visibility. Interestingly, this suggests threat related biases in the MVP paradigm could be 116	
modulated by, or perhaps even driven by residual awareness of the masked stimuli.  117	
 In MVP studies that have measured observers’ awareness of masked stimuli, this is 118	
usually implemented via an independent block of trials wherein observers complete an 119	
alternative forced choice (AFC) task, such as discriminating between different masked 120	
stimuli (Carlson, Reinke, & Habib, 2009; Fox, 2002; Mogg, Bradley, & Hallowell, 1994). In 121	
general, if observers’ performance does not significantly exceed chance performance in this 122	
control task, it is concluded that any threat biases obtained during the experimental trials can 123	
be attributed to processes that occur independently of awareness of the threat stimuli.  124	
Establishing null sensitivity to stimuli via a forced choice task in this way is 125	
associated with formidable practical and conceptual issues (Wiens, 2008). For instance, 126	
awareness checks in the MVP paradigm have typically lacked statistical power, i.e. the 127	
likelihood of type II errors (failure to detect an observer’s residual discrimination of target 128	
stimuli) may have been problematically high. Our meta analysis revealed that, on average, 129	
across MVP experiments, observers were classed as unaware of stimuli if 2AFC performance 130	
was less than 68%. Importantly, this permits deviations from chance performance that are 131	
moderate in magnitude (Cohen’s h = 0.38, see Cohen, 1977), which invalidates strong 132	
statements about truly ‘unconscious’ processing of the masked stimuli. Another statistical 133	
issue is that if observers are selected post-hoc on the basis of chance-level performance in an 134	
awareness check, then this can bias evidence in favour of unconscious processing - reflecting 135	
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a statistical principle referred to as ‘regression to the mean’ (Shanks, 2016). Therefore, it is 136	
important to assess not only this subset of observers, but also to consider whether individual-137	
level awareness of stimuli predicts attentional bias across the full sample of participants.  138	
Moreover, it is important to note that only one study employed a signal detection measure 139	
(d’- d prime) that corrected for individual response bias (Koster, Verschuere, Burssens, 140	
Custers, & Crombez, 2007). Taken together, these limitations suggest that more rigorous 141	
methods are needed to assess awareness1.  142	
Another interesting question, receiving increased attention, is whether any 143	
behavioural effects of ‘unconsciously’ presented stimuli depend on the method used to 144	
manipulate awareness. For instance, it is possible that threat stimuli can modulate attention 145	
independently of awareness, but that the brevity of masked presentations degrades processing 146	
of the target stimuli such that any attentional modulation is reduced and hard to detect. 147	
Masking necessitates presentation times that are substantially briefer (< 40 ms) than those 148	
chosen to optimise attentional cueing effects in standard, supraliminal versions of the visual 149	
probe task (usually around 500 ms; Bar-Haim, et al., 2007). Since the presentation of stimuli 150	
in the masked version of the visual probe paradigm is an order of magnitude briefer than in 151	
the standard version, this confounds any comparison between aware and unaware processing. 152	
A more direct comparison would require that subliminal stimuli are not so temporally 153	
disadvantaged, relative to a supraliminal counterpart. Continuous flash suppression (CFS), 154	
which is an increasingly popular method in the study of unconscious processing (Sklar et al., 155	
2012) may provide one solution to this problem. In CFS, stimuli presented to one eye can be 156	
suppressed from awareness by presenting a dynamic noise pattern to the other eye (Tsuchiya 157	
& Koch, 2005). With appropriate presentation parameters, CFS can render stimuli invisible 158	
for several seconds, allowing time for unconscious processes to engage with the suppressed 159	
9	
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stimuli. The use of CFS in a visual probe paradigm may therefore provide a more suitable 160	
comparison between unaware and aware states. 161	
Finally, a critical conceptual issue concerns the stimulus attributes that drive the 162	
prioritisation of threat stimuli across all paradigms: standard visual probe, masked visual 163	
probe and CFS. Although it has been demonstrated that certain classes of threat stimuli, such 164	
as fearful faces, are reliably prioritized, one idea gaining traction is that this prioritization 165	
may be better explained by their low-level properties than by threat-sensitive processes 166	
(Gray, Adams, Hedger, Newton, & Garner, 2013; Hedger, Adams, & Garner, 2015b; Stein & 167	
Sterzer, 2012). For instance, Lee and colleagues (2013) found that the increased luminance 168	
contrast resulting from the greater exposure of the scleral field (eye whites) in fearful faces 169	
(relative to neutral faces) was a good predictor of enhanced performance in an attentional 170	
cuing task. More recently, work from our own lab revealed that the relationship between a 171	
face’s amplitude spectrum and the human contrast sensitivity function was a better predictor 172	
of the face’s detectability in masking and CFS tasks than its perceived valence or arousal 173	
(Hedger et al., 2015b). For example, fear faces have greater luminance contrast at the spatial 174	
scales humans are sensitive to than angry faces, and this predicts their higher levels of 175	
detection. This sensory advantage of the fear expression is particularly important, since 176	
fearful faces give rise to the largest, most reliable threat-related biases in the MVP paradigm 177	
of all stimulus types (Hedger et al., 2016). As highlighted in our meta analyses, it is critical 178	
that researchers provide adequate stimulus controls such that threat-related biases driven by 179	
the semantic content of stimuli (i.e. their affective content) are distinguished from effects 180	
driven by simple low-level differences between stimuli. If processing advantages are driven 181	
by low-level stimulus properties, this negates the need to invoke unconscious processes 182	
sensitive to threat.  183	
10	
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The current study aims to address contentious or unresolved issues within the current 184	
literature. Specifically, we ask: (i) Do emotionally salient stimuli modulate attention in 185	
standard viewing conditions (i.e. with awareness of the stimuli)? (ii) Do emotional stimuli 186	
modulate attention under conditions of unawareness, as defined by stringent signal detection 187	
criteria? (iii) Are these effects modulated by the method used to render stimuli perceptually 188	
invisible? iv) Are attentional biases better explained by affective, or low-level variability 189	
across stimuli?   190	
 191	
Method 192	
Participants 193	
 Before recruiting participants, ethical approval for the study was obtained via the 194	
University of Southampton Research Ethics Committee (Submission ID: 17166). From our 195	
previous meta analyses (Hedger et al., 2016), we determined that 41 participants would be 196	
required to attain 95% power to detect the attentional effects observed when fear and neutral 197	
faces compete in the MVP paradigm (dz = 0.58). For this reason, data collection was 198	
terminated when 41 undergraduate students (9 male, M age = 20.2 years) had completed the 199	
experiment. All observers had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. 200	
Stimuli 201	
 Stimuli were four male facial models, taken from the NimStim face set (Tottenham et 202	
al., 2009), depicting neutral, fearful and happy expressions. All stimuli were placed within an 203	
opaque elliptical mask to eliminate external features and were equated in luminance and root 204	
mean squared (RMS) contrast. Face stimuli were presented in two configurations. Normal 205	
faces were presented upright with veridical contrast polarity. Upside-down negative faces 206	
were rotated 180 degrees with reversed contrast polarity, producing an image similar to a 207	
photographic negative (see Figure 1). These manipulations severely disrupt the recognition  208	
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Figure 1. Example face stimulus presented in the normal and upside-down negative 209	
configuration.  210	
 211	
and affective evaluation of facial expressions (Gray et al., 2013; Hedger et al., 2015b). 212	
Critically, however, these manipulations do not affect the low-level stimulus properties of the 213	
image: i.e., its RMS contrast, mean luminance and amplitude spectra (and therefore the 214	
energy / strength of image contours). Thus, if the valence of face images is critical in 215	
directing spatial attention, we would expect any effect of expression to be reduced or 216	
eliminated for the upside-down negative images, relative to the normal images (i.e. an 217	
interaction between expression and stimulus configuration). Conversely, if low-level 218	
properties of the stimuli explain the effect of expression, we would anticipate a similar main 219	
effect of expression for both normal and upside-down negative stimuli (i.e. no interaction 220	
between expression and stimulus configuration). All stimuli subtended 6.2 x 4.1 degrees of 221	
visual angle (DVA) at the viewing distance of 70 cm on a 1280 x 1024 pixel resolution, 222	
gamma corrected monitor. In all trials, observers viewed the display via a mirror stereoscope, 223	
and each eye’s image was framed by a random dot surround (9.5 x 11.4 DVA) to control 224	
vergence. 225	
 226	
Questionnaire Measures 227	
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 Previous work suggests that attentional biases towards emotional stimuli are 228	
modulated by anxiety and related trait characteristics (Fox, 2002; Mogg & Bradley, 1999). 229	
Before the visual probe experiment, all observers completed the following measures of 230	
general and social anxiety: Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI-T, Speilberger et al., 1983), Social 231	
Interaction Anxiety Scale (SIAS, Heimberg, Mueller, Holt, Hope, & Liebowitz, 1992) and 232	
Social Phobia Scale (SPS, Heimberg et al., 1992). 233	
 234	
Procedure 235	
 Each trial began with the presentation of a central fixation cross whose duration was 236	
randomly sampled from the range 300 to 1000 ms to avoid anticipatory responses. Observers 237	
completed 560 trials in total. On ‘signal’ trials (336 trials), pairs of face stimuli were 238	
presented to observers. On ‘noise’ trials (224 trials), no face stimuli were presented to 239	
observers; intermingling signal and noise trials enabled concurrent evaluation of stimulus 240	
awareness (see ‘noise trials’ section). There were three presentation conditions (Figure 2). 241	
 242	
Presentation Conditions 243	
Standard presentation. 244	
In the standard presentation condition (Figure 2a - 112 trials), two faces were 245	
presented monocularly (eye of presentation counterbalanced across trials) on either side of 246	
the fixation cross for 500 ms, whilst only the fixation cross and surround were presented to 247	
the other eye. Monocular presentation of face stimuli allowed a straightforward comparison 248	
with the CFS presentation condition. Immediately after the face presentation, a dot appeared 249	
at the location preceded by the left or right face and observers were required to report its 250	
location as quickly and accurately as possible (via left and right key button press).  251	
  Masked presentation. 252	
13	
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 In the masked presentation condition (Figure 2b - 112 trials), our trial sequence 253	
mirrored that of previous literature (Fox, 2002). Two face stimuli appeared binocularly either 254	
side of fixation for 17ms before being immediately replaced by two masks (patterns of high 255	
contrast ellipses) for 17ms.  A 17ms SOA between face and mask has been commonly 256	
employed in previous MVP studies (Beaver, Mogg, & Bradley, 2005; Fox, 2002; Koster, 257	
Verschuere, Burssens, Custers, & Crombez, 2007; Mogg & Bradley, 1999, 2002), due to the 258	
refresh rate of standard cathode ray tube (CRT) monitors. Immediately after presentation of 259	
the mask, a dot appeared at the location preceded by the left or right face and observers were 260	
required to report its location as quickly and accurately as possible.  261	
CFS presentation. 262	
In the CFS presentation condition (Figure 2c - 112 trials), two faces were presented 263	
monocularly (counterbalanced across eyes) on either side of the fixation cross for 500ms, 264	
whilst dynamic masking patterns (refresh rate of 10Hz) were presented to the other eye, on 265	
either side of fixation. Immediately after, a dot appeared at the location preceded by the left 266	
or right face and observers were required to report its location as quickly and accurately as 267	
possible.  268	
 269	
14	
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 270	
Figure 2. Schematic of trial sequences for the three presentation conditions. a) standard 271	
presentation b) masked presentation c) CFS presentation. Masked and CFS trials had an equal 272	
number of signal trials (trials where face stimuli were presented) and noise trials (trials where 273	
no face stimuli were presented) – these are shown in the leftmost panels. 274	
 275	
Stimulus Pairing Conditions 276	
Within each presentation condition (standard, masked, CFS) there were two stimulus-277	
pairing conditions, corresponding to emotion bias trials, and face bias trials (see Figure 3). 278	
	279	
Emotion bias 280	
Mirroring conventional visual probe studies, emotion bias trials (64 trials), were 281	
designed to measure whether an emotion bias exists, i.e. a tendency to allocate attention to 282	
emotional stimuli when a neutral and an emotional stimulus compete for resources (Figure 283	
3a). The face presentation consisted of an emotional face (32 fear, 32 happy) presented to one 284	
side of fixation and a neutral face presented to the other. Within each emotion bias pair, half 285	
of the trials were valid (subsequent probe appeared in the location of the emotional face) and 286	
half were invalid (probe appeared in the location of neutral face). These trials were repeated 287	
with face stimuli presented in both normal (16 trials, figure 3a) and upside-down negative 288	
configurations (16 trials, figure 3b). 289	
Face bias 290	
  Face bias trials (48 trials) were designed to measure any bias for more face-like 291	
stimuli in the allocation of selective attention when normal and upside-down negative face 292	
stimuli (with matching emotional expression) compete for resources (Figure 3c). In face bias 293	
trials, a normal face (16 neutral, 16 fearful, 16 happy) was presented on one side of fixation 294	
and a face with the same emotional expression, but in an upside-down negative configuration 295	
15	
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was presented on the other. Within each face bias paring, half of the trials were valid 296	
(subsequent probe appeared in the location of the normal face) and half were invalid (probe 297	
appeared in the location of upside-down negative face).  298	
 299	
Figure 3. Schematic examples of each stimulus pairing condition. a) Emotion bias trials 300	
(normal configuration). A normal emotional (fear or happy) and normal neutral face were 301	
presented either side of fixation. b) Emotion-bias trials (upside-down negative configuration). 302	
An upside-down negative emotional (fear or happy) and upside-down negative neutral face 303	
were presented either side of fixation. c) Face bias trials: a normal (fear, happy or neutral) 304	
and upside-down negative face (same expression) stimulus were presented either side of 305	
fixation.  306	
	307	
Noise Trials 308	
50% of the trials within the CFS and masked presentation conditions (112 masked, 309	
112 CFS) were ‘noise’ trials. These trials were identical to signal trials, except no face stimuli 310	
16	
EMOTION AND ATTENTION 
were presented prior to the mask (for masked presentations) or to the opposite eye to the 311	
mask (for CFS presentations). If observers are unaware of the stimuli, they should perform at 312	
chance in discriminating signal trials from noise trials (Wiens, 2008). Thus, on each trial, 313	
after the observer reported the location of the probe, they were prompted to indicate whether 314	
the preceding presentation had been a ‘noise’ trial or a ‘signal’ trial (by pressing the up or 315	
down arrow key). It was clearly explained to the participants that, within those trials that 316	
contained a mask, faces were presented on only 50%, and that they had to discriminate these 317	
cases from those in which no faces were presented. Participants were also informed that there 318	
were no time constraints for this response and that they should prioritise accuracy over speed. 319	
The 224 trials for each presentation condition meant that this forced choice task had adequate 320	
(80%) power to detect even very small deviations from chance performance (Cohens h of 321	
0.16 or larger). 322	
Summary 323	
All 41 observers completed 336 signal trials – 112 trials for each of the 3 presentation 324	
conditions (standard, masked, CFS), each comprising (i) 64 emotion bias trials: 2 emotions 325	
(fear vs. neutral, happy vs. neutral) x 2 face configurations (normal, upside-down negative) x 326	
16 repetitions, and (ii) 48 face bias trials: 3 emotions (neutral, fear, happy) x 16 repetitions). 327	
Participants also completed 224 noise trials (112 masked, 112 CFS). The side of the 328	
emotional /upside-down negative face, the eye of face presentation, the location of the probe 329	
and the validity of the probe were counterbalanced. Trial order was randomized for each 330	
participant.  331	
 332	
Results 333	
Observers’ Awareness of the Face Stimuli 334	
17	
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 Following standard practice, d’ values were computed from the difference between 335	
the z-transformed hit rates (proportion of signal trials that were correctly identified) and false 336	
alarm rates (proportion of noise trials that were incorrectly classified as signal trials). For 337	
masked presentations, d’ was consistent with poor discrimination between signal and noise 338	
trials - at the group level, performance was not significantly better than chance (M = 0.04, t 339	
(40)= 1.54, p = .130). No individual observer significantly exceeded chance performance in 340	
correctly discriminating signal and noise trials (assessed via binomial test, upper binomial 341	
limit = 127 correct responses). For CFS presentations, performance was slightly higher and 342	
significantly different from zero at the group level (M = 0.06, t (40)= 2.55, p = .015). At the 343	
individual level, two observers performed significantly above chance in distinguishing signal 344	
and noise trials. These two observers were excluded from further analyses (with the 345	
exception of the correlation analyses shown in Figure 6). After removal of these observers, 346	
the group d’ was not significantly different from zero for either masked (M = 0.04, t (38) = 347	
1.44, p = .158) or CFS (M = 0.04, t (38) = 2.01, p = .051) presentations.  348	
Visual Probe Data 349	
Data reduction and global measures. 350	
 Preliminary inspection of the data revealed that one observer only achieved 52% 351	
accuracy in the probe discrimination task. Given the trivial difficulty of this task 352	
(discriminating left probes from right probes) we reasoned that this observer did not engage 353	
with the task requirements and thus their data were not analysed further. The remaining 354	
observers achieved near- ceiling accuracy (M = 98.37%, SD = 1.97%. Response times (RTs) 355	
corresponding to incorrect responses were removed (0.75% of RT data) and a log transform 356	
was applied to correct for skew. The mean log RT was calculated for each observer for each 357	
presentation condition and cue validity. Values that were more than 3 standard deviations 358	
from these means were defined as outliers and removed (1.53%). The analyses reported 359	
18	
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below were conducted on the remaining 97.72% of the RT data. After the removal of outliers, 360	
RTs were within the normal range for visual probe studies (M =387 ms, SD = 101 ms).  361	
Emotion bias. 362	
To test whether observers’ attention was drawn to emotional faces, we calculated 363	
an emotion bias score from the emotion bias trials (invalid RT - valid RT) for each 364	
stimulus condition (fear or happy, within normal or upside-down negative configurations) 365	
such that positive values indicate that attention is drawn to the location of the emotional 366	
(rather than neutral) expression. These are summarised in Figure 4a.  In addition, we 367	
calculated the overall emotion bias in each of the three presentation conditions (pooled 368	
across expression and configuration), these are shown in Figure 4b.   369	
An overall emotion bias was detected for standard presentations (M = 19.79 ms, t 370	
(37)=2.33, p=.025), corresponding to a modest effect size (dz = 0.38, 95% CI [0.05 0.71]). 371	
However, in the masked and CFS conditions, no overall emotion bias was detected 372	
(masking: M= -7.26 ms, t (37) =-0.87, p=.382, CFS: M= 0.07 ms, t (37) =0.01 p=.991), 373	
and the effect sizes were small (masking: dz = -0.14, 95% CI [-0.46 0.17], CFS: dz = 0.00, 374	
95% CI [-0.32 0.32]). When comparing the magnitude of the emotion bias across 375	
conditions, a main effect of presentation condition was detected (F (2,74) = 3.096, p 376	
=.046). Thus, our data suggest that observers’ attention was drawn towards emotional 377	
stimuli under standard presentation, in which stimuli were fully visible, but not in masking 378	
or CFS trials.  379	
We can consider whether the emotion bias was modulated by expression (fear vs. 380	
happy) or configuration (normal vs. upside-down negative); if attentional allocation was 381	
driven by affective content, (i.e. the meaning of the stimuli) then we expect a larger 382	
emotion bias in the normal than the upside-down negative configuration, because 383	
expressions are harder to discriminate in the upside-down negative configuration. There 384	
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was no significant interaction between expression and stimulus configuration in any 385	
presentation condition (2-way ANOVAs, all p-values > .45). Importantly, this suggests 386	
that facial expression had no effect on attentional allocation beyond that explained by 387	
basic low-level variability between expressions. In fact, the emotion bias in the standard 388	
presentation condition (widely reported in previous literature: Bar-Haim et al., 2007) was 389	
smaller for normal than upside-down negative stimuli (normal: M = 18.56, upside-down 390	
negative: M = 21.02, t(37) = -0.17, p =.863). 391	
  392	
Figure 4. Attentional biases in emotion bias trials. a) Emotion bias (invalid RT - valid RT) 393	
plotted as a function of expression, stimulus configuration (normal, upside-down negative) 394	
and presentation condition. Error bars are +/- 1 SE. b) The overall emotion bias, expressed as 395	
Cohen’s dz is plotted as a function of presentation condition. Error bars are 95% confidence 396	
intervals. 397	
 398	
Face bias. 399	
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To determine whether observers’ attention was directed to more face-like stimuli, i.e. 400	
normal faces, as opposed to upside-down negative faces, we calculated a face bias score from 401	
face bias trials (invalid RT - valid RT) for each stimulus condition, such that positive values 402	
indicate that attention is drawn to the location of the normal face. The resultant face biases 403	
are summarised in figure 5a. Figure 5b shows the overall face bias effect size in each 404	
presentation condition (pooled across all stimuli). We detected a significant face bias in 405	
standard trials (M = 18.33 ms, t (37) = 2.19, dz = 0.36, [0.03 0.68], p = .035) and in CFS trials 406	
(M = 28.39 ms, t (37) = 2.98, dz = 0.49, [0.15 0.82], p = .005) but not in masking trials (M = -407	
11.01 ms, t (37) = -1.48, dz = - 0.24, [-0.56 0.08], p =.146). A significant effect of 408	
presentation condition (F (2,74) = 5.64 p =.005) was detected. Post hoc tests revealed that 409	
both standard (p =.015) and CFS (p =.003) presentations yielded larger face biases than 410	
masked presentations. We can ask whether these biases towards normal faces are modulated 411	
by expression. However, there was no significant main effect of expression F (2,74) = .099, p 412	
= .906, or interaction with presentation condition F (4, 148) = .92, p =.455. We detected no 413	
effect of expression within any presentation condition (one-way ANOVAs, all p-values > 414	
.377). Despite observers indicating low levels of overall sensitivity to the presence v absence 415	
of stimuli, one possibility is that small differences in sensitivity to normal vs. upside-down 416	
negative faces (e.g. Jiang, Costello & He, 2007) could account for the face biases in CFS 417	
trials. Since both normal and upside-down negative stimuli are presented in face bias trials, 418	
we tested this possibility by using the signal detection data from emotion bias trials task to 419	
predict face bias. Since ‘noise’ trials only differ at the level of presentation condition (CFS, 420	
masked), it is not possible to calculate d’ seperately for individual trial types (e.g. normal and 421	
upside-down negative trials). For this reason, we used hit rate as our measure of sensitivity in 422	
this analysis. We detected no association between differential hit rate (normal – upside-down 423	
negative hit rate) and face-bias magnitude (r (36)=-.06, [-.38 .261] , p=.703. 424	
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 425	
Figure 5. Attentional biases in face bias trials. a) Face bias scores (invalid RT - valid RT) 426	
plotted as a function of expression and presentation condition. Error bars are +/- 1 SE. b) The 427	
overall face bias, expressed as Cohen’s dz, as a function of presentation condition. Error bars 428	
are 95% confidence intervals. 429	
	430	
Modelling of Visual Probe Data 431	
 To better understand the stimulus attributes that predict attentional capture, and their 432	
relative importance, we developed a simple model to explain not just the mean difference 433	
between valid and invalid RTs within each stimulus pairing (which discards some, potentially 434	
informative RT information) but the full set of raw response times. In the visual probe 435	
paradigm, each trial represents a competition for attention between two stimuli (A and B). 436	
We use the term ‘salience’ (S) to represent the capacity of each stimulus to capture attention, 437	
i.e. SA and SB. If SA > SB then, when a probe follows stimulus A, reaction times (RTA) will be 438	
shorter, on average, than when it follows stimulus B (RTB). Reaction times are well 439	
approximated by a log-normal distribution, and so we model the probability distribution of 440	
reaction times as: 441	
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  442	
 443	
where μ  and σ  give the mean and standard deviation of the baseline distribution of log (RT), 444	
i.e. with two equally salient stimuli.  445	
 446	
We considered different stimulus attributes that might modulate stimulus salience. 447	
These included emotional content (emotional vs. neutral), threat (the additional salience of 448	
fearful faces, relative to happy faces) and configuration, i.e. similarity to a normal face 449	
(normal vs. upside-down negative).  We tested models that included only additive (e.g. 450	
emotion + configuration) or also interactive (e.g. emotion * configuration) combinations of 451	
these variables. These parameters were used to define the relative salience of stimuli, where a 452	
neural upright face is given a nominal saliency of 0. For example, if the salience of a stimulus 453	
were independently predicted by emotion and configuration (Model 5, Table 1), then the 454	
(relative) salience of normal fearful and happy faces is given by the emotion coefficient, and 455	
the salience of neutral upside-down negative faces is given by the configuration coefficient. 456	
A positive emotion coefficient indicates that emotional (fear and happy) faces are more 457	
salient than neutral faces and a negative configuration coefficient indicates that normal faces 458	
are more salient than upside-down negative faces. Interaction terms allow us to model the 459	
situation in which the effect of emotion or expression differs between normal and upside-460	
down negative configurations.  461	
 462	
 463	
 464	
 465	
23	
EMOTION AND ATTENTION 
 466	
Table 1.  467	
Summary of Tested Models and their Parameters 468	
Model Parameters 
1  (Null model) 
2  configuration 
3  emotion 
4  emotion, threat 
5  configuration, emotion 
6 configuration, emotion, threat 
7  configuration, emotion, configuration*emotion 
8  configuration, emotion, threat, config*emotion, config*threat.  
 469	
 Because our models differed in complexity (the number of free parameters), leave one 470	
out cross-validation (LOO xval) was used to evaluate the generalisation performance of all 471	
models and avoid over-fitting (see Supplementary Material S1). In this method, a model is fit 472	
to N-1 observers (training data) and the fitted values are used to predict the data from the ‘left 473	
out’ observer (test data). The performance of the model in predicting the new data (in terms 474	
of error) directly reflects the generalisation performance of the model in predicting new 475	
‘unseen’ data. One appealing property of LOO xval is that, unlike model performance indices 476	
such as Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) or Akaike’s information Criterion (AIC), there 477	
is no need to apply (ad-hoc) criteria to determine whether a more complex model’s improved 478	
fit (in terms of likelihood, or other goodness-of-fit metric) is justified by the increased 479	
number of free parameters. Instead, the LOO method will naturally reveal the number of 480	
parameters required to model the signal (but not the noise) within the dataset:  Unnecessarily 481	
complex models are implicitly penalised by this procedure, since they ‘overfit’ to the training 482	
data and therefore will have lower performance in predicting the left out (test) data. The 483	
results of the LOO xval procedure are displayed in Supplementary Material S2 (this figure 484	
illustrates that several models perform worse at cross-validation than the null model, 485	
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demonstrating the penalty associated with over-fitting). The fitted parameters for all models 486	
are summarised in Supplementary Material S3.   487	
  The model that best explains stimulus salience, and thus participants’ RTs, varied 488	
according to presentation condition (see Table 2). Under standard presentations, where 489	
observers were fully aware of the face stimuli, the data were best explained by a model of 490	
salience that included both emotion and threat (model 4). In other words, emotional stimuli 491	
attracted attention more effectively than neutral stimuli, and this effect was increased for 492	
threat-relevant fear faces. Importantly, models involving interactions between configuration 493	
and emotion or threat did not improve on this model. In other words, under conditions of full 494	
awareness, there is no evidence that emotional stimuli have increased salience, beyond that 495	
determined by their low-level image properties.  The modelling results are broadly in line 496	
with the traditional visual-probe analyses reported above, although they additionally have the 497	
increased sensitivity to reveal the increased salience of fear, relative to happy faces.  498	
 499	
Table 2.  500	
Best Fitting Models for Each Presentation Condition 501	
Presentation Condition Best Model Fitted coefficients M (SD) 
Standard 4  emotion:  5.98 (0.56) 
threat: 2.14 (0.64) 
Masking 2  configuration: 5.31 (0.42) 
CFS 2  configuration: -6.02 (0.37) 
 502	
For both masked and CFS presentations, the best model of participants’ RTs included 503	
only the stimulus configuration (model 2).  More complex models, involving stimulus 504	
emotion or threat did not have greater cross validation performance than the null model. This, 505	
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alongside the previous analyses, suggests that participants’ responses are not affected by 506	
facial emotion when faces are presented outside of awareness via backward masking or CFS. 507	
 508	
Association With Awareness and Anxiety Measures 509	
 Our previous work (Hedger et al., 2016) suggests that some emotion-related biases 510	
found in backward masking and CFS paradigms may be due to, or modulated by observers’ 511	
awareness of the stimuli. To determine whether such an effect exists in the current data, we 512	
examined the relationship between attentional bias and awareness of the stimuli (as indexed 513	
by performance in the ‘signal’ vs. ‘noise’ discrimination task) in the masked and CFS 514	
presentation conditions. For each observer, we computed a single attentional bias score, 515	
collapsed across all stimulus types, and a single d’ score for stimulus awareness, collapsed 516	
across CFS and masked presentations.  517	
Performance in the awareness task (i.e. the ability to distinguish ‘signal’ from ‘noise’ 518	
trials) was significantly and positively correlated with attentional bias (F (1,38) = 4.693, R2 = 519	
.086, p=.037), as shown in Figure 6a, suggesting that attentional biases are inflated when 520	
observers have some awareness of the stimuli. Notably, the best-fit line passes very close to 521	
(0,0), suggesting that awareness of the stimuli not only increases attentional bias, but may be 522	
required for attentional bias effects to occur. When the data were split by stimulus pairing, 523	
this revealed that the association between awareness and attentional bias was mostly driven 524	
by the emotion bias F(1,38) = 3.311, R2 = .080, p =.077  (Figure 6b) and that the face bias 525	
had a weaker association with awareness  F(1,38) = 2.003, R2 = .025, p =.166  (Figure 6c). 526	
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 527	
 528	
         529	
Figure 6. a) Association between overall d’ and overall attentional bias score. b) Association 530	
between d’ and emotion bias score. c) Association between d’ and face bias score.  Red lines 531	
are the least squares fit to the data, shaded region is +/- 1 SE.  532	
  533	
As shown in supplementary material S4, our measures of anxiety (STA-T, SPI, SIAS)  534	
 were highly correlated (all Pearson’s’ r > .43 all ps <.01), indicating good reliability of these 535	
measurements. Our primary research questions were unrelated to individual differences (e.g. 536	
participants’ levels of anxiety). However, previous research has suggested that biases toward 537	
emotional stimuli are inflated amongst anxious observers (Bar- Haim et al, 2006). For this 538	
reason, we performed correlation analyses to examine the association between attentional 539	
bias and anxiety measures (STAI-T, SPS, SIAS) in each presentation condition. No 540	
correlations were detected in any presentation condition for either emotion or face bias scores 541	
(all p-values >.05).  These correlations and their associated confidence intervals can be found 542	
in supplementary material S5. 543	
 544	
Discussion 545	
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Our experimental design allowed us to assess attentional orienting to neutral and 546	
emotional face stimuli under different conditions of awareness. A few key findings emerged: 547	
(i) In the standard, supraliminal paradigm, we found evidence that emotional faces attract 548	
attention when competing with neutral faces. Our stimulus configuration manipulation 549	
(normal v upside-down negative) allowed us to determine the extent to which this is driven 550	
by the low-level image properties of the stimuli vs. their recognisable emotional content. In 551	
fact, the effect of emotion was slightly larger for upside-down negative faces, suggesting that 552	
attentional allocation within our visual probe task was not driven by recognisable emotion. 553	
No emotion biases were found when stimuli were presented outside of awareness via 554	
masking or CFS. (ii) Normal faces attracted attention over upside-down negative faces within 555	
the standard and CFS conditions, suggesting a preference for more natural, face-like stimuli. 556	
(iii) Attentional effects were predicted by observers’ awareness of the stimuli, suggesting that 557	
attentional biases are modulated, or even driven by awareness.  558	
Attentional Capture by Emotionally Salient Stimuli 559	
 For standard, 500ms supraliminal trials, we observed attentional biases towards 560	
emotionally salient stimuli. Importantly, these effects were not reduced when the stimuli 561	
were presented in the upside-down negative condition (in fact, they increased slightly).  This 562	
suggests that the apparent effect of emotion on attentional allocation within the standard 563	
(conscious) visual probe paradigm was driven by low-level stimulus factors (e.g. luminance 564	
contrast), rather than emotional valence per se; the upside-down negative faces have vastly 565	
reduced recognisable emotional content (Gray et al., 2013). This finding suggests that 566	
previous reports of an attentional bias towards emotional stimuli may be attributable, at least 567	
in part, to low-level differences between stimuli. Fearful and happy facial expressions in 568	
particular tend to have more contrast energy at the spatial scales humans are sensitive to, 569	
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relative to neutral faces (Hedger et al., 2015). Thus, a processing advantage for these 570	
expressions is predicted on the basis of simple sensory factors alone.  571	
When stimuli were suppressed from awareness via masking and CFS, emotion bias 572	
effects were small and insignificant.  However, as with any null result, it is worth discussing 573	
possible sources of a type 2 error. On a statistical level, it is important to note that power was 574	
high and the sample size calculations were based on a large body of previous literature (see 575	
‘participants’ section). Secondly, in relation to the sample characteristics, the mean trait 576	
anxiety level was relatively high (M= 41.46) and above the value expected to produce 577	
detectable biases towards threatening stimuli under subliminal presentations (Hedger et al., 578	
2016). Unlike studies that have solely used masking to manipulate awareness, it is unlikely 579	
that null effects in unconscious presentations can be explained by simple restrictions on 580	
presentation time, since this was equated in normal and CFS trials (500 ms).  Importantly, we 581	
detected significant attentional bias effects under standard presentation conditions, suggesting 582	
that the task, in itself, was a sensitive measure of attentional allocation. Our results are 583	
consistent with studies that have failed to detect evidence of emotional modulation of 584	
attention under masking (Fox, Cahill, & Zougkou, 2010; Koster et al., 2007) and CFS 585	
(Hedger, Adams, & Garner, 2015a). 586	
The Thorny Issue of Low-level Confounds 587	
 In our study, we observed equivalent attentional cuing effects for normal and upside-588	
down negative stimuli and thus concluded that variability between stimuli in low-level image 589	
properties drives attentional cuing. It is worth discussing some competing explanations for 590	
our findings. 591	
  First, we consider whether normal and upside-down negative stimuli share some 592	
property (other than luminance contrast) that drives the attentional effect. For instance, 593	
upside-down negative stimuli could retain some (reduced) recognisable emotional content, 594	
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and this attracts attention to the same extent as the emotion as content within normal stimuli. 595	
We think this is unlikely for two reasons. Firstly, upside-down negative stimuli actually give 596	
rise to slightly larger attentional effects than normal stimuli (rather than smaller effects, see 597	
Figure 4). Secondly, we have previously demonstrated that upside-down negative facial 598	
expressions are not evaluated as being significantly different from neutral valence according 599	
to an Extrinsic Affective Simon Task (EAST). Specifically, the disruption caused by this 600	
manipulation was found to not simply reduce the magnitude of valence judgements, but 601	
generated a qualitatively pattern of effects (see Gray et al., 2013 experiment 2). 602	
 A second possibility is that the similar effects observed for normal and upside-down 603	
negative stimuli are not driven by a single, shared mechanism, but by two different 604	
mechanisms that happen to produce effects of similar magnitude. For example, might it be 605	
that normal faces capture attention via their emotional content, whereas upside-down 606	
negative faces capture attention via their low-level image properties?  Again, we believe that 607	
this explanation is unlikely. Firstly, it contradicts standard experimental logic – if one 608	
manipulates a potentially important experimental variable (e.g. emotional content), and finds 609	
no effect on the dependent variable (e.g. attentional allocation), the standard conclusion is 610	
that the variable is not as important as previously hypothesised.  Second, we have previously 611	
demonstrated that stimulus detection (across both normal and upside-down negative faces) is 612	
much better predicted by variations in luminance contrast than by variations in perceived 613	
valence or arousal (Hedger et al 2015b experiment 2). Moreover, a quantitative analysis of 614	
previous literature also reveals that the affective content of a stimulus is a poor predictor of 615	
its ability to capture attention in the MVP paradigm: our meta-analysis revealed that fearful 616	
faces are the only class of threat stimuli that reliably generate threat-related biases in the 617	
MVP paradigm. Angry faces, in contrast, yield small, non-significant effects (Hedger et al., 618	
2016).  Angry faces signal a direct threat to the observer, whereas fearful faces indicate the 619	
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presence of a proximal threat.  If threat directs attention within VP paradigms, this should be 620	
apparent for indicators of proximal threat (i.e. fearful faces), and direct threat (i.e. angry 621	
faces). Instead, parsimony favours an account based on the sensory advantages of the fear 622	
expression over the neutral or angry expression (Hedger et al., 2015b, Lee et al., 2013). 623	
Another potential objection could be that the unfamiliar/unusual quality of upside-down 624	
negative faces might drive attention. Crucially, it is worth noting that this concern would not 625	
apply to emotion bias trials, since both emotional and neutral face stimuli were presented in 626	
the upside-down negative configuration on these trials. We also explicitly test for the 627	
possibility that ‘unfamiliar’ upside-down negative stimuli attract attention over the more 628	
‘familiar’ normal stimuli in face-bias trials. However, the opposite effect was observed: 629	
attention was instead drawn to faces in the normal configuration. Moreover, rendering our 630	
upside-down negative stimuli ‘unfamiliar’ is a necessary and desired effect of the 631	
manipulation - if the face stimuli were recognisable in the upside-down negative condition, 632	
they would not provide a valid control for variations in low-level image properties. 633	
 Other objections to the conclusions drawn from our upside-down negative 634	
manipulation are more philosophical. Some authors have proposed that low-level image 635	
properties may drive efficient detection precisely because of their emotionality (Frischen, 636	
Eastwood, & Smilek, 2008). Under this line of reasoning, labelling the low-level variability 637	
between stimuli as a ‘confound’ is problematic, because the communicated emotion is 638	
defined by its low-level properties (e.g. patches of high contrast signal fear). This would 639	
undermine the idea of attempting to control for low-level stimulus properties in any 640	
perceptual experiment. Like others (e.g. Becker, Anderson, Mortensen, Neufeld, & Neel, 641	
2011), we believe that this position is unfalsifiable and unsound. Clearly, not all high-contrast 642	
stimuli are fear-inducing, and as discussed above, not all threatening stimuli are high-643	
contrast. Further, if one group of researchers holds the view that fear faces attract attention 644	
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because of their threat relevance and another claims that fearful faces attract attention due to 645	
low-level image properties, then the debate can only move forward by designing experiments 646	
that attempt to resolve between these competing possibilities.  647	
 Considering all evidence, we believe that simple low-level variability between stimuli 648	
provides the most parsimonious account of the attentional effects that we observe.  Other 649	
explanations are either i) harder to support with the available data, or ii) require additional 650	
assumptions.  651	
Implications for Clinical Work.  652	
Failing to control for, or characterize low-level stimulus properties can have serious 653	
implications. Consider populations who might be expected to show diminished threat 654	
processing, such as patients with a recent brain injury (Tsuchiya et al., 2009), or individuals 655	
who have received an intervention to alleviate anxiety symptoms (Murphy, Downham, 656	
Cowen, & Harmer, 2008). An apparent threat-related bias in these populations may be 657	
wrongly as interpreted as being indicative of ‘unimpaired threat processing’ or a ‘failed 658	
intervention’. In reality, it may be that these observers simply have normal sensitivity to the 659	
low-level variability between neutral and emotional stimuli.  Indeed, much of the 660	
unaccounted-for variation in the efficacy in a behavioral intervention for anxiety such as 661	
attentional bias modification (Mogg & Bradley, 2018) could be explained by low-level 662	
variability between stimulus categories. 663	
Attentional Preference for ‘Face Like’ Stimuli 664	
 We observed evidence for attentional biases toward normal faces when competing 665	
with manipulated, upside-down negative faces in both standard and CFS trials. The latter 666	
finding is consistent with a large body of work from the breaking continuous flash 667	
suppression (bCFS) literature, which has consistently demonstrated that upright faces break 668	
CFS suppression faster / more frequently than inverted faces (Jiang, Costello, & He, 2007; 669	
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Stein & Sterzer, 2012). In addition, there is evidence from fMRI that face-selective regions of 670	
the temporal cortex are differentially activated by upright vs. inverted faces even when these 671	
are presented under CFS (Jiang & He, 2006). The present study extends this literature by 672	
providing the first behavioural evidence that face-like stimuli attract spatial attention under 673	
CFS. Based on the present data, inferring a causal link between preferential detection of 674	
upright, normal faces (in bCFS studies) and attention to normal faces (in the present study) 675	
would be premature. Future work could test for the presence and directionality of such a 676	
causal relationship. 677	
 Why is it that CFS seems to spare selective attention to face like configurations (in 678	
face bias trials), but not emotional expressions (in emotion bias trials)? One possibility is that 679	
discriminating a face from a non-face (a coarse, basic-level classification) is easier than 680	
discriminating different expressions (a finer, sub-ordinate classification) and may thus be less 681	
affected by degradation associated with CFS suppression.  This sensitivity to upright faces 682	
cannot be explained by low-level stimulus properties such as contrast and spatial frequency 683	
profile, which are preserved after spatial and contrast inversion. Instead, the prioritised 684	
detection of upright faces appears to reflect some higher-level ‘face-sensitive’ process. An 685	
alternative explanation is that the preferential processing of upright faces does not reflect 686	
face-sensitive processes, but rather the fact that ‘top heavy’ patterns in general are more 687	
easily detectable, since humans have a robust upper hemifield advantage in basic visual 688	
sensitivity (Skrandies, 1987). In fact, recent work has shown that upright ‘protofacial’ stimuli 689	
(a simple triangular configuration of dots, resembling the position of the eyes and mouth) 690	
break CFS more rapidly than their inverted counterparts (Akechi et al., 2015). 691	
  Future work should aim to dissociate effects driven by face sensitive processes from 692	
effects driven by simple differences in sensitivity in the upper and lower hemifield. Clearly, 693	
these two possibilities have drastically different implications for the level and complexity of 694	
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visual processing that transpires without awareness. This, in turn, suggests caution when 695	
inferring high level processing based on a preference for normal, upright face configurations. 696	
Implications for Paradigms used to Manipulate Awareness 697	
 A recent concern, that has been raised by many, is whether the perceptual suppression 698	
induced by techniques such as masking and CFS are functionally similar to those that may 699	
occur under natural viewing conditions (Blake, Brascamp, & Heeger, 2014; Hesselmann & 700	
Moors, 2015). If they are not, then studies employing these techniques may tell us about the 701	
peculiarities of the techniques used, rather than revealing any characteristics of unconscious 702	
processing that generalise to natural viewing conditions. A related concern is that conclusions 703	
emanating from different paradigms used to manipulate awareness may not generalise to one 704	
another, since they do not index the same level of unconscious processing (Breitmeyer, 2015; 705	
Dubois & Faivre, 2014). This entails that a null effect in one paradigm does not necessarily 706	
entail the absence of unconscious processing, since affirmative findings may be found with a 707	
different paradigm. Our findings strengthen these concerns. For instance, based on our data 708	
from the standard and masked presentations alone, one could conclude that an attentional 709	
preference for face-like configurations (in face bias trials) depends on their conscious 710	
registration. By contrast, when these data are considered alongside the CFS data, one could 711	
conclude that the absence of such effects may be due to the methodological limitations of the 712	
masking paradigm. For instance, it may be the case that face-sensitive processes simply 713	
require a more sustained and robust visual signal than is supported by very brief, masked 714	
presentation.  Similarly, the absence of an emotion bias in CFS or masked presentations does 715	
not necessarily imply that emotional stimuli fail to modulate attention under all conditions of 716	
unawareness. For instance, Faivre, Berthet and Koudier (2012) found that affective priming 717	
was eliminated when primes were presented under CFS, but robust priming effects were 718	
observed when primes were rendered indiscriminable by crowding. The study of unconscious 719	
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processing is thus highly susceptible to the error of ‘denying the antecedent’ when 720	
interpreting null effects. 721	
Implications for Assessment of Awareness 722	
 If attentional cuing operates independently of awareness of the cuing stimuli, we 723	
should expect no association between discrimination of stimulus presence and the magnitude 724	
of the attentional cuing effect. Instead, our data reveal that increased stimulus awareness (as 725	
assessed by d’) predicted increased attentional biases, despite the limited range of d’ values 726	
and our sample’s relatively low level of sensitivity.  Recent research employing stringent 727	
signal detection measures of awareness have revealed that observers are more capable than 728	
previously assumed at detecting brief, masked signals. In fact, one study has shown that the 729	
majority of observers can reliably detect images of fearful faces that are masked after 25, or 730	
even 17 ms (Szczepanowski & Pessoa, 2007). Although these deviations from chance 731	
performance were small, they are non-trivial in the context of the attentional effects 732	
emanating from the masked visual probe paradigm, which are also very small. This, taken 733	
together with our own data, illustrates the importance of providing sensitive, well-powered 734	
and objective awareness measures.  735	
Implications for Emotion Theory  736	
 Several dominant neurocognitive theories of emotion assume independence of 737	
affective processing and awareness. Various ‘dual pathway’ models rest on the assumption 738	
that processing of affective visual stimuli involves a separable sub-cortical visual pathway 739	
that bypasses the visual cortex and projects affective information rapidly to emotionally-740	
responsive structures (e.g. the amygdala) independently of awareness. The first explicit 741	
model of this kind was formulated as early as 1885 (Lange, 1885) and adaptations of this idea 742	
have been presented more recently (LeDoux, 1996; Tamietto and de Gelder, 2010). Clearly, it 743	
would be rash to challenge the neuroanatomical aspects of such theories on the basis of our 744	
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behavioural data.  However, regardless of whether such a pathway exists, we find no 745	
evidence that it supports the preferential processing of threat stimuli in the absence of 746	
awareness. This accords with recent suggestions that the proposed subcortical pathway is 747	
highly unlikely to have the computational properties required to perform processes such as 748	
object identification, which would be required in order to differentiate threatening from 749	
nonthreatening signals (Cauchoix & Crouzet, 2013).  750	
  751	
Conclusion 752	
 In conclusion, our data suggest that attentional capture by emotionally salient stimuli 753	
is predicted by awareness. We detected attentional cuing effects under normal viewing 754	
conditions, but not under two different conditions of unawareness. Moreover, we provide 755	
direct evidence that an observer’s awareness of stimuli predicts the magnitude of attentional 756	
cuing effects. Finally, even under full awareness, we found that attentional cuing by 757	
emotionally salient stimuli was fully accounted for by low-level stimulus confounds. When 758	
considered alongside our meta-analysis, these findings could motivate a reinterpretation of 759	
previous literature and stimulate further well-controlled studies on the relationship between 760	
emotion processing, attention and awareness.  761	
	762	
	763	
	764	
	 	765	
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Footnotes 937	
  1 Notably, not all authors have claimed that observers were completely unaware of the 938	
masked stimuli, and have instead claimed that awareness has been “restricted” (e.g. Carlson 939	
& Reinke, 2008; Mogg & Bradley, 1999). Nonetheless, it remains a matter of contention, 940	
with theoretical importance, to determine whether emotionally salient stimuli attract attention 941	
under genuine conditions of unawareness. 942	
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